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Abstract: Social scientists have long recognized and sought to explain a connection between 
religious and political beliefs. Our research challenges the prevalent view that religion and 
politics constitute separate but related belief sets with a conceptual model that suggests the 
correlation between the two may be partially explained by an underlying psychological construct 
reflecting first principle beliefs on social organization. Moreover, we also push this challenge 
further by considering whether part of the relationship between political and religious beliefs is 
the result of shared genetic influences, which would suggest that a shared biological 
predisposition, or set of biological predispositions, underlies these attitudes. Using a classic twin 
design on a sample of American adults, we demonstrate that certain religious, political, and first 
principle beliefs can be explained by genetic and unique environmental components, and that the 
correlation between these three trait structures is primarily due to a common genetic path. As 
predicted, this relationship is found to hold for social ideology, but not for economic ideology. 
These findings provide evidence that the overlap between the religious and the political in the 
American context may in part be due to underlying principles regarding how to understand and 
organize society and that these principles may be adopted to satisfy biologically-influenced 
psychological needs. 
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Social scientists have long recognized and sought to explain a connection between 
religious and political beliefs. Alignment theories, for example, seek to explain why religious 
groups associate with American political parties (Layman 2001; Smidt, den Dulk, Froehle, 
Penning, Monsma and Koopman 2010), and individual-level studies of believing, behaving, and 
belonging suggest levels of religious commitment and orthodoxy co-vary with individual 
differences in political beliefs (Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 
2007). Yet, such frameworks do not provide comprehensive answers to questions of why 
religious and political orientations intersect. At least in part, this is because existing political 
science frameworks tend to treat political and religious attitudes as independent concepts and 
frequently ignore the common origins of these belief systems. The notion that these belief 
systems may not be independent, that they may be the product of common underlying 
environmental and, especially, biological forces has only been recently tested and integrated into 
a single, comprehensive theoretical framework within psychology to explain a general orientation 
toward authority (Bouchard 2009; Koenig and Bouchard 2006; Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard 
2013). We build upon this framework to explore two dimensions of ideology (economic         
and social) and the nature of their shared variance with religiosity and broader first principles   
for organizing society. 
We know that political and religious socialization occurs in families (Clark and 
Worthington 1990; Cornwall 1989; Jennings and Niemi 1974), that political and religious traits 
may be partially heritable (Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2005; Vance, Maes and Kendler 2010), and 
that political attitudes associated with religion are more consistently transmitted from parent to 
child as compared to other political items (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009; Tedin 1974; 
Thomas 1971). Why religious and political belief sets are mutually socialized across generations 
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and the nature of their possible common biological origins is less developed in multiple 
academic literatures. In short, we do not fully understand why or how political orientations and 
religious beliefs co-vary within individuals and across generations. 
Rather than thinking about religious beliefs influencing political attitudes through an 
intentional cognitive process (e.g. The Bible says homosexuality is wrong, therefore I oppose gay 
marriage) or political attitudes leading to changes in religious affiliation upon entering   
adulthood (Putnam and Campbell 2012), this study examines whether these belief systems 
overlap at least in part because they both represent an individual’s preferences for “bedrock 
principles of group life,” such as a preference for maintaining traditional moral values in society 
(Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford and Hibbing 2011b). Our research challenges the prevalent view 
that religion and politics constitute separate but related belief sets with a conceptual model that 
explains both political and religious beliefs as rooted in the same underlying psychological 
construct reflecting first principle beliefs on social organization. Moreover, we also push this 
challenge further by considering whether part of the relationship between political and religious 
beliefs is the result of shared genetic influences, which would suggest that a shared 
predisposition, or set of predispositions, underlies these attitudes. Our model does not exclude 
socialization and environmental experience as causal influences on the transmission and co- 
variation of political/religious beliefs, since even biological processes occur within some 
environmental context, but it does conceptualize these belief systems as inter-related rather than 
wholly independent, and at least partially driven by predispositions toward social order. The 
purpose of the current paper is to explore the sources of variation in religious and political beliefs 
within the population and to link these with beliefs about how society should be structured. 
Using a classic twin design, we are able to examine the source of the shared relationship between 
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ideology, religiosity, and preference for traditional social values and show that they covary due 
to both genetic and environmental factors. 
Religion and Politics 
Religious and political belief systems are both means by which individuals organize and 
understand societies. Political ideology is typically conceptualized as a coherent set of stable 
beliefs about group life (Jost 2006, see also Converse 1964) or, as Downs put it, “as a verbal 
image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society” (Downs 1957, 
96). Religious beliefs likewise provide a central source of preferences for social rules and order 
(Emerson and Smith 2000; Hunter 1991; Mockabee, Wald and Leege 2012; Wuthnow 1988). In 
terms of social beliefs, those on the political left place more emphasis on reducing inequality and 
promoting progressive social change while those on the right support maintenance of current 
social hierarchies and traditional values (Haidt 2012; Jost 2006), which in contemporary America 
includes social inequality resulting from a belief in economic individualism (Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, and Sulloway 2003). Similarly, when it comes to religion and society, American 
Christians1 on the theological left emphasize social justice here on Earth while those                  
on the theological right focus on an individual’s relationship with God and the afterlife (Emerson 
and Smith 2000; Friesen and Wagner 2012; Hunter 1991; Layman 2001; Smidt, Kellstedt and 
Guth 2009; Wuthnow 1988). 
 
Traditionally, the religious and the political have been treated as separate but related 
realms – institutionally, across society, and within individuals. There seems to be evidence that 
these belief systems have shared elements that may point to individuals possessing a single 
underlying predisposition toward the organization of society, and at the very least, individuals 
 
 1 This paper will focus on Christianity as its primary religious system as it is the overwhelming majority religion in 
the United States (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007). 
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may draw upon similar bedrock principles in forming their religious and political preferences. 
Preliminary evidence for innate political and religious predispositions has been established in 
behavioral genetics and can point us to methods for identifying whether these predispositions 
stem from a common source with each other and with bedrock principles. Though political 
science traditionally treats behavior and attitudes as products of purposive political socialization 
from parents, peers, and schools (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009; 
Zuckerman, Dasović and Fitzgerald 2007), Alford, Funk, and Hibbing’s (2005) work on the 
heritability of political attitudes challenged this environmental determinism. This research 
launched numerous studies demonstrating that political orientations, beliefs, interest, and 
participation are at least partially heritable and may be linked to specific genes (e.g., Fowler and 
Dawes 2008; Hatemi, Medland, Morley, Heath and Martin 2007; Settle, Dawes, Christakis and 
Fowler 2008). Heritability studies do not argue for biological determinism, but indicate that 
genetics explain some portion of the variance in the transmission of, for example, social and 
political beliefs across generations in addition to and in concert with environmental factors. 
Numerous heritability studies of religiosity have also demonstrated the concurrent 
influence of genetic and environmental factors on religious beliefs and behaviors. These studies 
provide a helpful starting point in determining which facets of religiosity may share genetic 
variance, and therefore a common predisposition, with political attitudes. Two commonly 
utilized measures of religiosity are religious attendance and religious importance. Whether one 
attends religious services is at least in part the result of environmental factors, with mixed results 
on the heritability of religious attendance (Bradshaw and Ellison 2008; Truett, Eaves, Meyer, 
Heath and Martin 1992). As is often the case with outward behaviors, as opposed to inward 
beliefs, church attendance seems especially influenced by one’s familial environment (Eaves, 
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Hatemi, Prom-Womley and Murrelle 2008), but there has been some evidence of genetic effects 
(Bradshaw and Ellison 2008; Kirk et al. 1999; Kendler and Myers 2009). Within the study of 
religiosity, the strongest heritability findings have been for specific religious beliefs (such as 
being born again) and the influence of religious beliefs in one’s life, or religious importance 
(Bouchard, McGue, Lykken and Tellegen 1999; Bradshaw and Ellison 2008). Bradshaw and 
Ellison (2008) suggest that higher genetic effects for individual beliefs and religious orientations 
versus outward religious behavior demonstrate that private actions may be motivated more by 
predispositions and the latter by social influences. For the purpose of this study, these findings 
suggest that shared predispositions are most likely to occur between political attitudes and 
religious beliefs, rather than between political attitudes and religious behaviors. The theory that 
political beliefs may be adopted to satisfy deep-seated psychological needs has been well 
developed (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway 2003); the same may be true of religious 
beliefs, and their correlation with political beliefs may point to a common predisposition or 
psychological need that is being satisfied by both belief systems. 
One of the most comprehensive studies of behavioral genetics and religiosity found 
significant genetic effects for all seven of their dimensions of religiosity (Kendler, Liu, Gardner, 
McCullough, Larson and Prescott 2003; Vance, Maes and Kendler 2010). When these factors 
were entered into a multivariate behavior genetic analysis, results revealed that, “one common 
genetic factor affects the predisposition to become religious, whereas unique environmental 
factors shape the specificity of how religiosity phenotypes are expressed” (Vance, Maes and 
Kendler 2010, 759). In this way, religious attitudes may or may not intersect with, overlap, or 
influence political beliefs, depending on the environment. If political elites are not tapping into 
religious frames (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986) or individuals are simply 
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unengaged in politics – or religion – there may be very little overlap between the two realms. In 
the American context, where there is considerable covariation between religiosity and political 
attitudes (Putnam and Campbell 2012; Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009; Wald and Calhoun- 
Brown 2007), we could expect to see a shared genetic path between religious and political 
attitudes that may or may not be found in other societies. For example, measures of religious 
motivation and belief have been extended to non-religious orientations, such as belief and 
motivation in the Communist Party in the USSR, and predict similar social attitudes found with 
these measures on American Christians (McFarland 1998). Though McFarland’s (1998) study 
did not use behavior genetics, the attitudinal similarities across these belief systems suggest that 
both religious and political beliefs may be adopted to satisfy underlying psychological needs and 
that these needs may be satisfied by different belief systems in different environments. On this 
view, certain individuals may have a psychological propensity to approach life based on an 
organized set of beliefs, and whether this is expressed through religious views, political party 
affiliations, or something else depends upon their cultural and political environment, how they 
were raised, and what they encounter as adults. Some individuals may become political, some 
religious, some both, and some neither. 
In one of the few studies of political-religious genetic relationships, Bouchard (2009, 
169; Koenig and Bouchard 2006) provides an empirical basis for this explanation by arguing for 
the presence of a “Traditional Moral Values Triad”, which includes the following: 
authoritarianism (how families should be organized), religiousness (who controls the universe), 
conservatism (how societies should be organized). These items strongly correlate, replicate 
across studies, and demonstrate strong heritability effects. Bouchard explains this phenomenon, 
“Traditionalism,” as the evolutionary adaptiveness toward obedience and respect for authority, 
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aspects of social organization that are foundational to both theology and ideology. Bouchard 
offers a theoretical and empirical basis for a genetic connection that demonstrates that 
individuals who believe in a strict religious moral code also enforce a strict code in their homes 
and expect a similar orientation in society. These connections were demonstrated in a recent 
study that found a common genetic factor underlying right wing authoritarianism, conservatism 
on political issues, and religious fundamentalism (Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard 2013), 
suggesting that there is a heritable personality orientation underlying the various scales used in 
their analysis. 
While an important development in the direction of our work, this study focused upon 
explaining a specific personality type, akin to recent work on the concurrent development of 
personality and political traits (Verhulst, Eaves and Hatemi 2012), that underlies how individuals 
express their preferences in the social, religious, and political realms. Our study builds upon this 
framework by identifying specific paths for shared genetic influence between religiosity, 
ideology, and bedrock social principles, the latter of which may help with issues of culturally 
specific constructs (Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard 2013). In addition, Ludeke, Johnson, and 
Bouchard (2013) propose that their examination of traditionalism or obedience to authority may 
uncover one factor behind religious and political beliefs but that this factor is likely separate  
from a related but different trait regarding egalitarianism or economic issue preferences (Funk et 
al. 2013). By distinguishing internal religious beliefs from external religious behaviors, 
separating social and economic ideology, and examining three distinct sets of bedrock social 
principles, we are able to demonstrate that genetics explain covariation between some of these 
variables, but not others. This approach gives us additional insight into why political attitudes 
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and religious beliefs co-vary by identifying not only where genes play a role, but also where they 
do not. 
In summary, numerous studies show that religious beliefs and individual-level political 
attitudes are correlated, and that religious and political beliefs are transmitted across generations. 
Yet though these belief systems are clearly related within individuals and across generations, 
they are overwhelmingly conceptualized and studied as independent constructs that are 
exclusively products of purposive socialization and environmental experience. We challenge this 
traditional view with a conceptual model that explains political and religious beliefs as arising in 
part from the same underlying psychological construct that reflects first principle beliefs on 
social organization, resulting in mutually reinforcing beliefs in both the political and religious 
realm. We argue that these three constructs share common genetic and environmental 
underpinnings. This model does not exclude socialization and environmental experience as 
causal influences on the transmission and co-variation of political/religious beliefs, but it does 
conceptualize these belief systems as inter-related rather than wholly independent, and at least 
partially driven by genetic predispositions toward social order. 
The purpose of the current study is to explore the sources of variation within the 
population for the overlap of religious and political beliefs. Using a classic twin design, we are 
able to partition this sample’s variance into influences due to genetics, the shared environment, 
and the unshared environment, concluding that the source of the shared relationship between the 
political and the religious is quite dependent on the measure at hand. That is, some political and 
religious relationships are more due to genetics, some to the environment, and some both. 
Hypotheses and Methods 
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We hypothesize that political beliefs, religious beliefs, and bedrock social principles are 
heritable, and more importantly, that the correlation between these variables is at least partially 
explained by a common genetic pathway. These hypotheses will be tested using a classic twin 
design with the Survey on Social and Political Issues through the Minnesota Twin Family 
Registry, a birth-record based registry containing approximately 8,000 twin pairs born in 
Minnesota from 1936 to 1955; our sample only includes those born in 1947 through 1955. Thus, 
the twins in this study ranged in age from 53 to 61 years. The Survey on Social and Political 
Issues is publicly available data gathered between July 24 and December 22, 2008, and July 13 
to October 30, 2009. The University of Minnesota implemented data collection with a postal 
mail invitation and follow-up letter, and respondents were offered a $35 incentive for their 
participation in 30- to 40-minute survey. Most respondents engaging a web survey – though a 
paper questionnaire was available to a few respondents in 2008 who had limited access to the 
Internet. All 146 respondents used paper surveys during the 2009 collection period. When 
combining the two survey periods, there were 1,349 individuals who completed the 
questionnaire, including 1,192 members of twin pairs where both individuals responded to the 
survey and 157 had a twin that did not complete the survey. We limit our sample for the 
following analyses to the 1,192 respondents that were part of a matched twin pair. 
Measures 
 
Because attitudes on issues of the day can vary generationally and culturally, we were 
interested in testing whether broader measures of bedrock principles might underlie both political 
and religious beliefs and help to explain the overlap between the two. For example, a Wilson- 
Patterson battery used below and in the Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard (2013) study would 
measure attitudes on items like gay marriage, which similarly to issues of segregation of the past, 
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will vary by age cohort. Smith et al. (2011b, 381) developed a “Society Works Best” (SWB) 
index to tap a psychological construct argued to be the basis of political ideology by addressing 
“the core dilemmas facing all mass-scale societies.” Admittedly, this forced choice measure 
(detailed below) is novel and newly tested, providing some limitations on scale reliability. 
Nevertheless, it is an effort to generate a measure that is not dependent on cultural context or 
time period and has been replicated in twin samples in the United States and Australia and 
correlates, but does not perfectly overlap, with self-reported ideology, party identification, and 
policy preferences (for more on this scale, see `, Smith, and Alford 2014). 
The Society Works Best questions provide respondents a forced choice between two 
options, such as “Society works best when people live according to traditional values or people 
adjust their values to fit changing circumstances.” The original authors of the scale sought to put 
together a battery of items that ranged from preferences on fixed or fluid values, notions of 
leadership (which would be similar to other authoritarian measures), and whether the group or 
individual is valued more. In this way, the Society Works Best battery seeks to define societal 
and political orientations beyond the dimensions of concepts similar to Right Wing 
Authoritarianism or Social Dominance Orientation. A factor analysis on the inaugural SWB 
survey (in a separate study) revealed a five-factor solution, which Smith et al. (2011b) labeled 
along the following dimensions: Traditional values/moral codes, outgroups/rulebreakers, role of 
group/individual, leadership, and absolutes. After conducting a principal components analysis on 
the twin dataset, three factors emerged with eigen values over 1 that fit into theoretical categories 
reflecting the following concepts: traditional values/moral codes, role of group/individual, and 
leadership. Items that loaded on the absolutes factor in Smith et al. (2011b) collapsed into the 
traditional values/moral codes factor, and the items from Smith et al.’s outgroups/rulebreakers 
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factor loaded onto the group/individual factor – thus, this scale seems to be capturing basic ideas 
about moral codes, groups, and leaders. The twin dataset is a larger sample (1,171 vs. 200), and 
this reduced factor solution makes intuitive sense in the way the questions combined to form 
three ways of thinking about how society should be organized. Thus, while the factor structure of 
the Society Works Best battery is not the central focus of this paper, we note that researchers  
may want to investigate in the future the possibility that a three-factor structure is most 
appropriate. 
Each item was coded 0 for the more liberal position (e.g. “Society works best when 
people assume that all those in far away places are kindly”) and 1 for the more conservative 
answer (e.g. “Society works best when people realize the world is dangerous”). These scores 
were combined into an additive index for all items – SWB Full – and three additive subscales for 
the categories of SWB Values, SWB Group, and SWB Leader. We consider both the full scale 
and the subscales in the analyses below. Because the SWB Values subscale will emerge as the 
focus of the majority of our models, we wish to put this measure in the context of other 
psychological or social scientific question batteries. The spirit of several of the SWB Values 
questions may capture some of the same latent preferences of Right Wing Authoritarianism, but 
the language used in SWB is more general and simplified as compared to RWA questions, such 
as “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion 
than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's 
minds” (Altemeyer 1981). In this way, SWB could possible avoid some of the criticisms scholars 
have lodged at RWA (Ray 1989) for use of heavy-handed wording and measurement suggesting 
“conservatism is being held up as a pathology by the left-leaning denizens of academic 
psychology” (Hibbing, Smith and Alford 2013, 103). 
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Though political attitudes and behavior were the focus of the twin survey used in this 
analysis, there were several religiosity measures included. We decided to select an internal or 
belief-oriented measure of religiosity -- importance of religion in one’s life (m=0.64, SD=.33) – 
as well as an external or behavior-oriented measure, frequency of religious service attendance 
(m=0.52, SD= 0.29).2 Because certain religious measures or political items may be more 
heritable than others and represent distinct psychological constructs (Bradshaw and Ellison 
2008), we do not collapse them together as this may obscure whether there is a shared genetic or 
environmental path between certain items and not others. For example, the correlation between 
religious service attendance and political attitudes or first principles may be best explained by 
environmental effects, since attendance is a behavior and behaviors are often found to be less 
subject to genetic effects (Bradshaw and Ellison 2008). By contrast, an internal belief like the 
importance of religion in one’s life may overlap with political items partially due to genetics. 
We measure political ideology with a set of questions designed to capture political 
conservatism, as measured by a Wilson-Patterson inventory (Wilson and Patterson 1968; see 
online codebook for the version used). The full scale is designed to measure political 
conservatism broadly defined, but the multi-item format also allows us to separate out social and 
economic ideology. 
A correlation matrix of the key variables is displayed in Table 1 and the cross-twin 
correlations for MZ and DZ twins are displayed in Table 2. Importance of religion is positively 
 
 
 2 Religious affiliation (identification of Protestant, Catholic, etc.) is excluded from this analysis 
because the categories are too broad to tap into dimensions related to the overlap between 
religious and political beliefs. The other two religious options were self-identification as born 
again, which we excluded because it is a dichotomous variable and the methods used here 
assume normality, and self-identification as a spiritual person, which we excluded due its lack of 
variance (85% of the sample indicated yes, they were spiritual, including a number of religious 
individuals). 
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related with the Full SWB battery, conservative political ideology, and their subscales (with the 
exception of SWB Group), such that higher scores on the religious measures are associated with 
more conservative views on how society should work. Next, we turn to partitioning the variance 
between these measures into environmental and genetic components. 
[Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
Methods 
 
In this study, we rely on a classic twin design to examine the genetic and environmental 
covariance between bedrock social principles, political ideology, and religiosity. Classic twin 
designs focus on population variance, rather than population means, in order to decompose the 
covariance between twins on a given trait into genetic, shared environmental, and unique 
environmental components (Medland and Hatemi 2009). The genetic component explains how 
much of the similarities between individuals on a specific trait are due to “gene-based 
predispositions, needs, wants, desires, or motivations” (Bradshaw and Ellison 2008, 531). The 
shared environment accounts for the portion of similarity that stems from twins being raised 
within the same families and reflects all of the influences in their environment that they have in 
common. The unique or unshared environment refers to any experience that is not shared 
between the twins, whether it is differences realized during childhood or as adults. 
A classic twin design is a natural experiment that uses a handful of simple assumptions to 
estimate these parameters: the difference in genetic relationships between monozygotic 
(identical) and dizygotic (nonidentical) twin pairs raised together and the similarity of their 
common environments. Specifically, monozygotic (MZ) twins are assumed to share all genetic 
variance because they come from a single fertilized egg, while dizygotic (DZ) twins are assumed 
to share 50% of their genes (on average) because they come from two fertilized eggs. Secondly, 
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the equal environments assumption posits that the shared environments of twin pairs (parents, 
schools, friends, time period, geographic region, etc.) have the same influence on the traits being 
studied, regardless of whether the twins are MZs or DZs. Though MZ twins may be treated more 
similarly than same-sex DZ twins (e.g., more likely to be dressed alike), what is important is that 
this type of treatment or shared experience will not affect the trait in question – which seems to 
be the case for political and social attitudes that will be examined here (Smith, Alford, Hatemi, 
Eaves, Funk and Hibbing 2012). What varies in the model, then, is the number of genes shared 
by the twin pairs. 
As mentioned above, MZ twins share 100% of their genes and DZ twins share, on 
average, around 50% of their genes, the same as non-twin siblings. In comparing the difference 
in the correlations between each MZ and DZ twin pair, higher correlations for monozygotic 
twins relative to dizygotic twins indicate that a portion of that trait’s variance may be due to 
genetic influences. If the correlations between the two types of twin pairs are very similar, then 
the resemblance will be due to common environmental experiences, as all twin pairs were raised 
together. Finally, if there is little relationship between twins on a certain trait, we can conclude 
that unshared or unique environmental experiences are influencing that trait. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In order to test the relationship among political ideology, the Society Works Best index, 
and religiosity, we conduct a series of twin models using OpenMx for R (Boker, Neale, Maes, 
Wilde, Spiegel, Brick, Spies, Estabrook, Kenny, Bates, Mehta and Fox 2011), including 
univariate, bivariate, and trivariate twin models to characterize the variance in each trait; the 
goals of each of these models are presented conceptually in Figure 1. Using structural equation 
modeling, the unit of analysis is the twin pair, and the comparison of the variance decomposed 
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into genetic (A), shared environment (C) and unique environment (E) components from MZ to 
DZ twins is akin to the between-groups and within-groups comparison in an ANOVA (Medland 
and Hatemi 2009; Smith et al. 2012). The “E” term also encompasses measurement error in the 
model. Structural equation modeling was used to develop a saturated model, then a full ACE 
model and AE, CE, and finally E submodels. This model-fitting process allows for measures of 
statistical significance to provide confidence in the results. For example, if the full ACE model is 
not significantly different from the fully estimated, saturated model, then we can be more 
confident in the results produced from this well-fitting model. Moreover, if we drop the various 
other components (A, C, or E), we can test the resulting model against the ACE model to 
determine whether model fit has significantly improved or deteriorated. Under this procedure,  
the best-fitting model is the model which utilizes the least parameters without significantly 
reducing the model fit when compared to models which leave the parameters unconstrained. In 
other words, the best-fitting model is the model that is most parsimonious while still fitting the 
data. 
The univariate analyses for each variable serve three purposes. First, they provide an 
initial estimate of the degree to which each trait (e.g., religious importance) is the result of 
genetic and environmental factors (i.e., the bolded paths in Figure 1A). Second, they provide a 
baseline against which the more complicated bivariate and trivariate models can be compared. In 
particular, we checked for large deviations in estimates of the total heritability of a trait, which 
might indicate problems with the models. Third, the univariate models allow us to select 
variables for subsequent analysis that are more likely to have the comparable variance structures. 
Correlated variables with similar variance structures are appropriate to model simultaneously in 
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order to identify common variance components (e.g., two variables that reduce to an AE model, 
rather than one that reduced to an AE model and another that reduced to a CE model). 
Following the univariate analyses, the second set of analyses presents a series of bivariate 
Cholesky decompositions (see Medland and Hatemi 2009). The bivariate models allow us to 
compare the extent to which the genetic and environmental factors underlying these variables are 
shared in common. In other words, a bivariate model can determine whether the genetic and 
environmental factors that lead to higher religious importance also lead to greater political 
conservatism (i.e., the bolded paths in Figure 1B). It also estimates the extent to which there are 
other genetic and environmental factors which influence religious importance but do not 
influence political ideology, or vice versa. 
An alternative (but statistically identical) way to conceptualize the bivariate models is as 
correlated factor models that decompose the correlation between two variables into its genetic 
and environmental components (see Loehlin 1996). This approach asks whether the genetic 
factors underlying one variable are correlated with the genetic factors underlying a second 
variable (i.e., the bold paths in Figure 1C). If these genetic paths are correlated, then part of the 
correlation between the two variables is due to shared genetic factors. For example, is the 
observed correlation between religious importance and political conservatism the result of 
genetic factors that affect both variables, environmental factors that affect both variables, or 
some combination of both genetic and environmental factors? From this perspective, just as the 
univariate model aims to decompose the variance in a trait into genetic and environmental 
components, the bivariate model aims to decompose the covariance between two traits into 
genetic and environmental components. 
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Finally, the trivariate model decomposes the variance of three variables simultaneously. 
The added benefit of this approach, above and beyond the univariate and bivariate models, is that 
it can determine whether there is a single genetic or environmental source of variance that 
underlies all three variables jointly (i.e., the bolded paths in Figure 1D). A common genetic path 
may imply that there is a predisposition that causes these traits to co-occur, whether directly, 
mediated through one of the measured traits (e.g., the one that emerges earliest), or through some 
earlier, unmeasured trait. A common unique environmental pathway may imply that there is  
some set of individual experiences that causes these traits to co-occur, but that these experiences 
are not shared across siblings or at least have unrelated impacts on siblings. We provide full 
model estimates for ACE, AE, and CE specifications for all analyses in appendix Tables 1, 2,  
and 3, for univariate, bivariate, and trivariate analyses, respectively. 
Univariate results 
 
The univariate results allow us to get a view of which variables have heritable 
components and which variables do not in order to appropriately narrow the search for genetic 
covariance between traits in the bivariate and trivariate analyses. This section examines several 
measures of religiosity, political ideology, and preferences about how society should be 
organized. Although we estimated several different models for each variable, for brevity and 
clarity of presentation we do not report every estimated parameter below. Full univariate model 
estimates for ACE, AE, and CE specifications for all variables discussed here are available in 
appendix Table 1. 
Religiosity 
 
We examine two measures of religiosity in our data. First, we consider the importance of 
religion in one’s life, which is an attitudinal variable that captures an individual’s orientation 
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towards religion. When we estimate a full ACE model, we find a significant genetic component 
(A, 42.4% of the variance in religious importance; 95% CI: 11.5 - 55.5), a significant unique 
environment component (E, 52.1% of the variance; 95% CI: 44.5 - 61.0), and a non-significant 
common environment component (C, 5.6%; 95% CI: 0 - 31.2).3 This model suggests that there is 
little to no variance in religious importance that can be attributed to common environment effects 
(i.e. environmental factors that impacted equally on both twins), supporting the literature on the 
heritability of internal or belief-oriented phenotypes of religiosity (Bradshaw and Ellison 2008). 
The result reflects the fact that the correlation among monozygotic twins’ religious importance is 
much higher than the correlation among dizygotic twins’ religious importance (see Table 2). We 
next estimate a more parsimonious AE model, which constrains the C component to zero, and 
find that it does not significantly decrease the model fit (pACE = 0.65). Therefore, we treat the AE 
model as the best-fitting model for religious importance. This model divides the variance in 
religious importance about equally between genetic and unique environmental factors (A = 
48.4%, 95% CI: 40.1 - 55.7; E = 51.6%, 95% CI: 44.3 - 59.9). Thus, we conclude that both 
genetic and unique environmental factors play a significant role in religious importance. 
Second, we consider religious attendance, a self-reported behavioral variable that 
captures the regularity of attending religious services. When we estimate a full ACE model, we 
find a significant common environment variance component (C, 29.8%; 95% CI: 3.5 - 50.5), a 
significant unique environment component (E, 48.5%; 95% CI: 41.4 - 56.9), and a moderate, but 
statistically insignificant genetic effect on religious attendance (A, 21.7%; 95% CI: 0 - 51.2). For 
religious attendance, an AE model has a significantly worse fit than an ACE model (pACE = 
 
 3 Because the results presented here are reported as a percent of the variance accounted for in a 
trait, the confidence interval on these estimates cannot extend below zero. To determine if a 
coefficient is significant, we utilized the 95% confidence interval around the standardized path 
coefficients reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3 of the appendix. 
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0.01). Therefore, between the ACE and AE models of religious attendance, the ACE model is to 
be preferred due to its improved fit, even though it is less parsimonious than the AE model. The 
CE model, which constrains the genetic A component to zero, has only a marginal decrease in fit 
when compared to a full ACE model (pACE = 0.07). We interpret the CE model as the best-fitting 
model for religious attendance. This model divides the variance in religious attendance about 
equally between common environmental and unique environmental factors (C = 47.1%, 95% CI: 
40.2 - 53.3; E = 52.9%, 95% CI: 46.7 - 59.8). The CE model suggests that there is little to no 
variance in religious attendance that can be attributed to genetic factors. The result reflects the 
fact that the correlation among monozygotic twins’ religious attendance is approximately the 
same as the correlation among dizygotic twins’ religious attendance (see Table 2). 
Thus, religious importance and religious attendance appear to have different variance 
structures. Both have large unique environmental effects, suggesting the impact of idiosyncratic 
life experiences on the development of religious importance and religious attendance. Although 
the estimates of the unique environment components of these variables will also be somewhat 
inflated due to measurement error (since both religious importance and religious attendance were 
measured with single items), the models do find significant genetic and common environment 
effects, respectively. The models that best fit these data suggest that religious importance is 
heritable and has a negligible common environmental component, while religious attendance is 
not heritable and has a large common environmental component. These differences replicate 
some prior research on the heritability of religiosity. Church attendance (when not combined as 
part of an index) has been found to be primarily a result of both shared and unique environmental 
influences (Truett et al. 1992), though some studies have reported genetic effects (Bradshaw and 
Ellison 2008; Kirk et al. 1999; Kendler and Myers 2009). The variance in the importance of 
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religion in guiding one’s life is divided between genetics and the unique environment (Bradshaw 
and Ellison 2008). Because church attendance has no significant genetic component, we exclude 
this variable from further analysis that seeks to determine whether there is shared genetic 
variance among religiosity, political attitudes, and first principle beliefs. Instead, we focus the 
analysis on the relationship of these other variables to religious importance. 
Bedrock values 
 
We also conducted univariate analyses on several measures of what we consider first 
principles, or the respondents’ fundamental views about how society should be organized, as 
measured by the Society Works Best (SWB) index and its subscales. The full scale is designed to 
measure views across the political spectrum, with the SWB Group subscale capturing views on 
the role of the indiviudal and the group and the SWB Values subscale representing preferences 
for stability of beliefs or external standards of behavior.4 The best-fitting models are AE for the 
Full SWB scale (pACE = 1.00; A = 38.0%, 95% CI: 28.7 - 46.3; E = 62.0%, 95% CI: 53.7 - 71.3), 
the SWB Group subscale (pACE = 1.00; A = 34.4%, 95% CI: 24.7 - 43.2; E = 65.6%, 95% CI: 
 
56.8 - 75.3), and the SWB Values subscale (pACE = 1.00; A = 38.6%, 95% CI: 29.2 - 47.0; E = 
 
61.4%, 95% CI: 53.0 - 70.8).5 All of these models suggest that these fundamental values contain 
a significant heritable component, albeit one that is smaller than the unique environmental 
 
 
4 We do not report results for the leadership subscale because the low variance and high skew in 
this sample render this variable inappropriate for methods that assume normality. 
5 For the full scale and group subscale of the Society Works Best index, the MZ correlation is 
more than twice the DZ correlation. This suggests that it may be more appropriate to run ADE 
models for these variables, which estimate dominance effects (D) that capture certain types of 
gene by gene interactions instead of common environment effects. However, because it is not 
possible to estimate common environment and dominance effects simultaneously without an 
extended twin family design, and because our hypotheses do not hinge on whether the genetic 
effects that we are examining are additive or non-additive, we instead report ACE and AE 
models for all variables. In these models, we interpret the A as an estimate of broad-sense 
heritability, which includes both additive and non-additive genetic effects (see Coventry and 
Keller 2005). 
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component of the variance in each case. Moreover, we find no significant common 
environmental component in these variables. 
Political Ideology 
In examining the Wilson-Patterson battery of political attitudes, the best-fitting model for 
the full scale was an AE model (pACE = 0.51; A = 65.1%, 95% CI: 58.7 - 70.5; E = 34.9%, 95% 
CI: 29.5 - 41.3). This model suggests that political issue attitudes are highly heritable, and that 
common environmental influences do not play a significant role. These results are consistent 
with past research (Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2005). Moving beyond previous behavioral genetic 
studies of political ideology, we also divided political attitudes into social and economic 
components (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012; Feldman and Johnston 2014; Miller and 
Schofield 2003). These were constructed by creating a social ideology subscale (12 items, α = 
0.84) and an economic ideology subscale (3 items, α = 0.54).6 These scales were moderately 
correlated (r = 0.40). We also created a measure of social ideology that is free of economic 
preferences and a measure of economic ideology that is free of social preferences by regressing 
these scales on each other, and keeping the residuals. By comparing the results of the full and 
residualized measures we can gain a richer picture of the relationships between political ideology, 
religiosity, and core values. 
 
For the non-residualized measures, we find greater heritability in social ideology (pACE = 
0.23; A = 63.3%, 95% CI: 56.9 - 68.8; E = 36.7%, 95% CI: 31.2 - 43.1) than in economic 
ideology (pACE = 0.73; A = 39.2%, 95% CI: 30.2 - 47.3; E = 60.8%, 95% CI: 52.7 - 69.8), but no 
 
 
 6 The lower reliability of the economic ideology measure likely contributes to the higher unique 
environment component (E) in this measure. However, despite the lower reliability, we are able 
to find significant genetic effects on economic preferences in many of the analyses. Moreover, 
economic ideology may simply have less internal consistency than social ideology or suffer from 
greater measurement error (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008), as evidenced by the lower 
median heritability among the single economic items as compared to the single social items. 
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significant role of common environment effects in either. These results suggest that both social 
ideology and economic ideology have heritable components, but that genetic factors may play a 
greater role in social ideology. When we consider the residualized measures (e.g., economic 
ideology removing the covariance with social ideology), we still find greater heritability in social 
ideology (pACE = 0.16; A = 50.8%, 95% CI: 42.7 - 57.8; E = 49.2%, 95% CI: 42.2 - 57.3) than in 
economic ideology (pACE = 0.49; A = 26.9%, 95% CI: 16.8 - 36.3; E = 73.1% 95% CI: 63.7 - 
 
83.2) and no significant role of common environment effects in either. The reduced heritable 
components in both residualized models indicate that the shared variance may have a sizeable 
genetic component. In addition, the residualized models suggest that both types of ideology have 
significant heritable components that are unshared with the other type. 
The univariate results for social ideology, Society Works Best values, and religious 
importance are displayed graphically in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Bivariate Results 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The bivariate analyses aim to parse the covariance between religious importance and the 
ideological and Society Works Best variables discussed above into its genetic and environmental 
components. In other words, these analyses partition the observed correlation between religious 
importance and the other variables into genetic, common environment, and unique environment 
components. These correlations can give us insight into why these social and political variables 
are related to religiosity. As in the univariate results, the best fitting bivariate models for 
religiosity and these other variables were AE models, so we limit our discussion of common 
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environment effects below. Full bivariate model estimates for ACE, AE, and CE specifications 
for all analyses are available in appendix Table 2. 
In order for bivariate models to parse the covariance between two variables into its 
components, there must be some observed covariance between the variables (i.e. the variables 
must be correlated). We find that, on average, individuals with more conservative policy views 
and with more conservative bedrock principles place higher levels of importance on religion in 
their lives than individuals with liberal views (see Table 1). Although there are significant 
correlations between the religious importance and the full Society Works Best scale and the full 
Wilson-Patterson, by examining the subscales, it is possible to determine that these correlations 
are being driven by specific components of the full scale measures. Specifically, we find stronger 
correlations of religious importance with the SWB Values subscale and with the social ideology 
component of the Wilson-Patterson than the full-scale measures. Conversely, we find that the 
SWB Group subscale is not significantly correlated with religious importance and that the 
economic ideology component of political ideology is only weakly correlated with religious 
importance (see Figure 3A). However, the weak correlation between economic ideology and 
religious importance is no longer significant when the covariance between social ideology and 
economic ideology is removed. Because the uncorrelated components of the full scales cannot 
logically contribute to the genetic or environmental covariance between the full scales and 
religious importance, we exclude the groups subscale from further analysis and focus on 
partitioning the covariance of religious importance with traditional values, social conservatism, 
and economic conservatism. These results suggest that while constructing a broader scale of 
religiosity or ideology may be a valuable approach to some research questions, focusing on the 
components of these larger belief systems may provide additional insight that would otherwise 
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be obscured (e.g., into the pathways through which genetic and environmental influences can 
contribute to covariation). 
The bivariate analysis of religious importance and social ideology shows that the 
correlation between these two variables is driven by both genetic and environmental factors (see 
Figure 3B; Figure 3C shows the full AE model). The AE model, which constrains the C 
component to zero, has no significant decrease in fit when compared to a full ACE model (pACE 
= 0.43) and may be interpreted as the best-fitting model for these two variables. The AE results 
 
show that of the total variance in social ideology, 24.7% is accounted for by genetic effects that 
are shared with religious importance (95% CI: 17.1 - 33.2) and 6.3% is accounted for by unique 
environment effects that are shared with religious importance (95% CI: 3.7 - 9.7). When we 
consider the AE results for the residualized version of the social ideology measure (having 
removed the covariation with economic ideology, pACE = 0.27), we find similar results (A = 
21.2%, 95% CI: 13.9 - 29.6; E = 6.3%, 95% CI: 3.3-10.4). These results suggest that, even 
having removed the covariation between social and economic ideology, the connection between 
social ideology and religious importance is primarily genetic. 
The conclusions from the bivariate analysis of religious importance and economic 
ideology are somewhat different. With the unresidualized measure of economic ideology, the AE 
model suggests that a statistically significant portion of the variation in economic ideology is 
caused by a genetic effect that is shared with religious importance (A = 4.5%, 95% CI: 1.4 - 9.6) 
and that the correlation between these variables is not caused by unique environmental effects 
that impact on both variables (E = 0.0%, 95% CI: 0 - 1.0). However, when we remove the 
covariation between economic ideology and social ideology, the genetic effect that is shared 
between religious importance and economic ideology is no longer present (A = 0.0%, 95% CI: 0 
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- 1.1). Taken together, these analyses suggest that insofar as economic ideology and religious 
importance are correlated, this correlation is genetic, and that this genetic correlation is also 
shared with social ideology. We test this interpretation directly in the trivariate section below. 
Turning to the values sub-scale of the Society Works Best index, the bivariate analysis of 
religious importance and SWB Values shows that the correlation between these two variables is 
also driven by a mix of genetic and environmental factors. The AE model, which constrains the 
C component to zero, has no significant decrease in fit when compared to a full ACE model 
(pACE = 0.96) and may be interpreted as the best-fitting model for these two variables. Again, of 
the total variance in religious importance, a majority of the variance that is shared with SWB 
Values is genetic. However, only a smaller percentage of the total variance in religious 
importance is shared with SWB Values (10.7%). 
There are several noteworthy features of these results. First, in all models, the correlation 
between religious importance and conservatism was driven primarily, but usually not 
exclusively, by genetic factors. Nearly 40% of the total genetic variance in social ideology is 
shared with religious importance; by contrast, less than 20% of the total unique environmental 
variance in social ideology is shared with religious importance. These findings leave open the 
question as to what types of life experiences may play a role in religious importance. Second, in 
both models, the majority of the variance in religious importance is unshared with the other 
variable (e.g., 87.2% of the variance in religious importance was accounted for by components 
that are unique to religious importance in the bivariate analysis with traditional values),7 
 
indicating that there is still much of the religious that is not explained by first principles or 
 
 
 7 For the relationship with social ideology and economic ideology, we can determine the 
proportion of variance in religious importance that is unshared with these variables by re- 
ordering the variables in the model so that religious importance is the second variable. This 
procedure is discussed in greater detail in the trivariate analysis section. 
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political attitudes. This is not contrary to our hypothesis as we are not suggesting a perfect 
overlap between the two frameworks. 
In sum, the bivariate results suggest that both genetic and unique environmental factors 
underlie the correlations of religious importance with social ideology and SWB values. The large 
genetic component in these relationships suggests that there may be a common underlying 
predisposition that leads individuals to adopt conservative bedrock social principles and political 
ideologies while simultaneously feeling the need for religious experiences. Importantly, these 
relationships with religiosity only hold when we consider social ideology and a preference for 
stable values in organizing society, and much more weakly or not at all when we consider 
economic attitudes or attitudes toward individuals and groups in the organization of society. 
Trivariate results 
 
The bivariate models leave open a key question: are the genetic/environmental factors 
that impact jointly on religious importance and social policy attitudes the same 
genetic/environmental factors that impact jointly on religious importance and traditional moral 
values, or are these two distinct pathways from genes to religious importance? The trivariate 
model addresses this question by testing for a genetic path that is common to all three variables. 
Full trivariate model estimates for ACE, AE, and CE specifications for all analyses are available 
in appendix Table 3. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Our findings confirm the existence of a common genetic factor that underlies holding 
socially conservative policy positions, maintaining traditional values, and placing importance on 
religion in one’s life. If we order the variables in the presumed causal order (traditional values to 
religious importance to social ideology, see Figure 4A), the ACE model suggests that there is a 
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genetic component that is shared by these three variables and that accounts for 37.1% of the 
variance in social ideology (95% CI: 11.4 - 63.2). For comparison, the unique environmental 
component that loads on all three variables accounts for 5.9% of the variance in social ideology 
(95% CI: 3.3 - 9.4). In the AE model, which is best-fitting (pACE = 0.41), this shared genetic 
component accounts for 34.1% of social ideology (95% CI: 24.7 - 44.4). In addition, there is a 
genetic component that is uniquely shared between religious importance and social ideology that 
accounts for 6.9% of social ideology (95% CI: 2.6 - 12.5). The AE results suggest that nearly 
65% of the genetic variation in social ideology is shared with religious importance and 
traditional values, compared to about 25% of the environmental variation in social ideology. For 
economic ideology, a similar AE model finds that less than 20% of the genetic variation and 
around 5% of environmental variation in economic ideology is shared with religious importance 
and traditional values. 
Re-ordering the variables in the trivariate model does not affect model fit; statistically, 
the models are identical. However, it can provide insight into how genetic and environmental 
variation is shared between the different variables. A model which places social ideology first, 
followed by traditional values and religious importance, allows us to address the following 
question: is there any variation in religious importance that can be explained by the traditional 
values measure above and beyond what is already accounted for by social ideology? Both the 
ACE model and the better-fitting AE model (pACE = 0.41, as above) show that the genetic and 
environmental factors that are shared between traditional values and religious importance are 
also fully shared with social ideology. This is indicated in the model because the paths from the 
A1 and E1 components to religious importance are significant and, simultaneously, the paths 
from the A2 and E2 components to religious importance are not significant (see Figure 4B). 
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Even so, in the AE model, the genetic component that is shared by social ideology, traditional 
values, and religious importance accounts for only about 40% of the genetic variance in religious 
importance and less than 20% of the total variance in religious importance. The unique 
environmental component that is shared by all three variables accounts for about 16% of the 
unique environmental variance in religious importance and about 9% of the total variance in 
religious importance. Though these components account for a sizeable portion of the variance in 
religious importance, the bulk remains unaccounted for. 
In addition to this shared genetic variance, the results also indicate that there are genetic 
influences that are unique to each variable. As indicated above, the majority of the genetic 
variance in religious importance is not shared with social ideology or one’s orientation toward 
traditional values. This points to the need to identify other variables which may share a common 
genetic pathway with religious importance or which may act as mediators of the effect of genetic 
factors on religious importance. This same research agenda applies to the study of political 
ideology and bedrock social principles. 
The focus on the genetic pathways above should not detract from the consideration of 
environmental factors. In fact, one of the benefits of utilizing a classical twin design is that it 
provides insight into the environmental factors that contribute to variance as much as it does to 
genetic factors. Our results indicate that social ideology, religious importance, and traditional 
values also share a common unique environmental factor. This suggests that there are some 
environmental influences or experiences that cause these variables to covary. Although this factor 
is of less substantive significance than the genetic factor, as indicated by the smaller cross-     
trait path loadings from the E components in Figure 4, it is still statistically significant and 
deserving of attention in future research. 
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In sum, these findings provide support for the hypothesis that there is a common 
predisposition or set of predispositions that underlie these three variables, and future research 
should seek to identify both the genetic and environmental factors that influence these traits 
individually. However, while these common factors account for a significant portion of the 
variance in each trait, it should be noted that each trait also has genetic and unique environmental 
components that are unshared with the other two traits. 
There is one further insight that can be gleaned from the trivariate modeling approach. If 
we model social ideology, economic ideology, and religious importance, we can test directly 
whether economic ideology has any relationship with religious importance above and beyond its 
shared variance with social ideology. The results, as with those for traditional values discussed 
above, suggest that the genetic and environmental factors that are shared between economic 
ideology and religious importance are also fully shared with social ideology. This is indicated in 
the model because the paths from the A1 and E1 components to religious importance are 
significant and, simultaneously, the paths from the A2 and E2 components to religious 
importance are not significant (see Figure 4C). In sum, these data suggest that the observed 
correlation between economic ideology and religious importance is fully accounted for by part of 
the relationship between social ideology and religious importance. 
Discussion 
 
In our sample, certain religious, political, and first principle beliefs can be explained by 
genetic and unique environmental components, and the correlation between these three trait 
structures is primarily due to a genetic path. These findings provide evidence that the overlap 
between the religious and the political in the American context may be due to underlying 
principles regarding how to understand and organize society and that these principles may be 
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adopted to satisfy biologically-influenced psychological needs (Jost et al. 2003; Ludeke, Johnson 
and Bouchard 2013). However, despite these shared influences, there is still a significant amount 
of genetic and environmental variation in these traits that remains to be accounted for, which 
suggests that future research should continue to explore alternative pathways in explaining these 
variables. 
The existence of genetic and environmental factors that link these traits indicate that a 
common predisposition, some other trait, or possibly some combination of traits, may be a 
significant contributor to the development of these three belief systems. Moreover, future 
research that searches for variables that explain the effect of genes on political ideology should 
move beyond considering only Big Five personality traits and consider other variables like 
religiosity. Indeed, psychologists and social scientists have suggested that even though there are 
small effect-size associations between religiosity and personality trait schemes like the Big 5 
(Robbins, Francis, McIlroy, Clarke and Pritchard 2010; Francis 2010; Hills, Francis, Argyle, and 
Jackson 2004; Saroglou 2002), religiosity is quite possibly a separate trait dimension that is not 
wholly represented by openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and emotional 
stability (Mondak 2010; Saucier and Goldberg 1998). Yet, religiosity has clear ties to various 
political attitudes and behaviors and is thus an important construct to explore in trying to 
understand the origins and dimensions of ideology. 
Future research should also seek to generalize our findings by replicating them in more 
diverse samples and with multi-item measures of religiosity. The nature of the sample (middle 
aged, largely white, largely Midwestern) leaves open questions regarding whether the link 
between religiosity, values, and political ideology is conditional on generational differences, age, 
racial and class dynamics, or regional and cross-national factors. Addressing these questions 
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would significantly advance our understanding of the interconnections among these variables. In 
addition, although we were restricted to a single-item measure of religiosity in this sample, future 
research should consider what can be gained from utilizing a multi-item measure of religiosity in 
a genetically information sample (see also Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard 2013). The 
differences that we find between social and economic ideology are instructive on this point, as 
they would have not been detected had we used a single-item measure of political ideology. 
Unfortunately, few datasets exist that contain a breadth of religious and political measures. 
 
An alternative explanation to our study may be that individuals interpret saying religion 
is an important guide in one’s life and agreeing that “Society works best when people live 
according to traditional values” as the same thing. But this is precisely our point. The SWB 
battery does not prime respondents for religion and, with its set up, seeks to ask respondents to 
not think of how “I work best” or “how I want to live my life,” but rather how communities 
should function. That is, individuals may tend to separate the personal, interpersonal, and 
political realms (Alford and Hibbing 2007). The conflation of religious and political beliefs may 
be due to political and religious phenotypes representing the same latent trait or an interpretive 
cognition issue. Either way, demonstrating a shared genetic path between these variables and 
social ideology challenges the traditional social science treatment of religion and politics as 
separate theoretical realms, and this genetic path could explain either something like a latent trait 
of first principles or a cognitive conflation of concepts. 
For example, in their discussion of “pathways to conservative identification,” Ellis and 
Stimson (2011) posit that a sub-set of Americans self-report a conservative ideology while 
simultaneously supporting progressive government policies. One of their explanations is that 
some individuals may be conflating conservative religious theology with political conservatism. 
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Our findings here support their argument: when individuals think about organizing society 
around moral values, they seem to be drawing upon a predisposition that also encompasses 
relying on religious belief in day-to-day decision making. This partially heritable religious 
orientation does not explain their economic policy preferences or their group attitudes, which 
may lead some of them to be “conflicted conservatives” (Ellis and Stimson 2011, 126). 
Our research also supports the broader agenda that political ideology should not be 
treated as a unidimensional construct (e.g., Feldman and Johnston 2014). If we are to develop 
more nuanced models of political beliefs and their relationship to religion and other variables, it 
is necessary to examine not only the relationships among the aggregate measures of these 
constructs, but also their components. For example, our findings suggest that the pathways that 
explain shared variance between social ideology and religiosity also account for all of the 
variance shared between economic ideology and religiosity, but that these pathways account for 
a much greater proportion of the variation in social ideology than they do in economic ideology. 
This raises questions about what other traits may jointly underlie social and economic ideology 
and what traits explain variation in economic ideology but not social ideology. 
Future research should consider the ways in which environmental factors can impact the 
effect of genes on social ideology, religiosity, and their covariation. This could occur through a 
gene by environment interaction, where the effects of genes differ across environments, or a gene 
by environment correlation, where genetic factors affect the likelihood that an individual will 
select into a particular environment. If the heritability of the overlapping political and religious 
attitudes can be thought of as the “ability to think or behave in accordance with one’s internal, 
biological motivations” (Bradshaw and Ellison 2008, 531), adding the reinforcement of an 
external behavior like church attendance may further strengthen or augment these beliefs. 
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In sum, our results provide strong support for the notion that political and religious 
beliefs are in part the result of shared genetic and environmental factors. These genetic and 
environmental factors are also shared with endorsement of bedrock social principles regarding 
traditional moral values in society, suggesting that political and religious beliefs may in part stem 
from a common orientation towards change in society, which may be expressed in obedience to 
authority, social conformity, or some other notion of organizing group life (Ludeke, Johnson,  
and Bouchard 2013; Feldman 2003). Whether this underlying disposition exhibits political, 
religious, or both belief sets, then, is dependent on an individual’s exposure to these 
environments. As mentioned earlier, a 1980s study in the USSR (McFarland 1998) determined 
that applying a religiosity battery to attitudes toward the Communist Party predicted the same 
relationships with social preferences as those identified when these measurements were used with 
American Christians. This provides more evidence for predispositions toward social order, which 
may inform religious and political beliefs that are dependent or “activated” by one’s  
environment. Findings along these lines could contribute to our understanding of what drives 
individual political attitudes, how genetic and environmental factors contribute to the formation 
and shifts in public opinion, and ultimately whether instantiated political-religious 
predispositions, much like personality, may drive political disagreement and conflict. 
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Table 1: Within-twin correlations of religious, Society Works Best, and political variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Religiosity 
(Importance) 
Religiosity 
(Attendance) 
SWB 
(Full) 
SWB 
(Values) 
SWB 
(Group) 
SWB 
(Leader) 
Ideology 
(Full) 
Ideology 
(Social) 
Ideology 
(Economic) 
 
Note: Bold pair-wise correlations are significant at p < .05 
Religiosity 
(Importance) 
Religiosity 
(Attendance) 
SWB 
(Full) 
SWB 
(Values) 
SWB 
(Group) 
SWB 
(Leader) 
Ideology 
(Full) 
Ideology 
(Social) 
Ideology 
(Economic) 
1         
0.58 1        
0.21 0.20 1       
0.32 0.30 0.78 1      
-0.01 -0.02 0.75 0.25 1     
0.12 0.13 0.48 0.27 0.13 1    
0.44 0.40 0.59 0.57 0.34 0.26 1   
0.53 0.51 0.52 0.56 0.22 0.27 0.92 1  
0.16 0.08 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.12 0.61 0.40 1 
 
 
Table 2: Cross-twin correlations of religious, Society Works Best, and political variables 
 
MZ Twins  
 Religiosity Religiosity SWB SWB SWB SWB Ideology Ideology Ideology 
 (Importance) (Attendance) (Full) (Values) (Group) (Leader) (Full) (Social) (Economic) 
Religiosity 
(Importance) 0.48 
        
Religiosity 
(Attendance) 0.35 0.51 
       
SWB 
(Full) 0.13 0.18 0.39 
      
SWB 
(Values) 0.20 0.25 0.33 0.38 
     
SWB 
(Group) 0.02 0.04 0.30 0.14 0.37 
    
SWB 
(Leader) 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.19 
   
Ideology 
(Full) 0.31 0.27 0.42 0.35 0.30 0.18 0.64 
  
Ideology 
(Social) 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.36 0.22 0.19 0.60 0.62 
 
Ideology 
(Economic) 0.16 0.06 0.23 0.14 0.21 0.10 0.43 0.36 0.39 
Note: Bold pair-wise correlations are significant at p < .05 
DZ Twins          
 Religiosity Religiosity SWB SWB SWB SWB Ideology Ideology Ideology 
 (Importance) (Attendance) (Full) (Values) (Group) (Leader) (Full) (Social) (Economic) 
Religiosity 
(Importance) 0.27 
        
Religiosity 
(Attendance) 0.30 0.41 
       
SWB 
(Full) 0.08 0.13 0.15 
      
SWB 
(Values) 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.19 
     
SWB 
(Group) -0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07 
    
SWB 
(Leader) 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.14 
   
Ideology 
(Full) 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.37 
  
Ideology 
(Social) 0.27 0.31 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.36 0.39 
 
Ideology 
(Economic) 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.15 0.21 
Note: Bold pair-wise correlations are significant at p < .05 
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Variable 
Religiosity (Importance) 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Religiosity (Attendance) 
 
 
 
SWB (Full) 
 
 
 
SWB (Values) 
 
 
 
SWB (Group) 
 
 
 
SWB (Leader) 
 
 
 
Ideology (Full) 
 
 
 
Ideology (Social) 
 
 
 
Ideology (Economic) 
Twin 
type 
 
Mean 
 
Standard Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
N 
All 0.64 0.33 0 1 1322 
MZ 0.64 0.33 0 1 775 
DZ 0.64 0.33 0 1 547 
All 0.52 0.29 0 1 1322 
MZ 0.52 0.29 0 1 775 
DZ 0.52 0.29 0 1 547 
All -0.10 0.36 -1 1 1324 
MZ -0.10 0.37 -1 0.83 774 
DZ -0.10 0.35 -1 1 550 
All -0.31 0.63 -1 1 1326 
MZ -0.31 0.62 -1 1 775 
DZ -0.30 0.63 -1 1 551 
All 0.24 0.41 -1 1 1331 
MZ 0.24 0.42 -1 1 777 
DZ 0.24 0.41 -1 1 554 
All -0.71 0.54 -1 1 1336 
MZ -0.71 0.55 -1 1 782 
DZ -0.73 0.53 -1 1 554 
All 0.54 0.14 0.10 0.91 1285 
MZ 0.54 0.14 0.10 0.91 750 
DZ 0.54 0.14 0.18 0.91 535 
All 0.52 0.19 0.06 0.96 1313 
MZ 0.52 0.19 0.06 0.96 769 
DZ 0.52 0.19 0.06 0.96 544 
All 0.72 0.19 0 1 1331 
MZ 0.71 0.19 0 1 781 
DZ 0.72 0.19 0 1 550 
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Appendix 
 
Religiosity variables 
[Attendance] 
How often do you attend religious services? 
• More than once a week 
• Once a week 
• Once or twice a month 
• A few times a year 
• Rarely 
• Never 
 
[Importance] 
Whether or not you attend services, how much do you consider religion to be an important part 
of your life? Would you say your religious beliefs provide... 
• A great deal of guidance in your day-to-day living 
• Quite a bit of guidance in your day-to-day living 
• Some guidance in your day-to-day living 
• Are not an important part of your life 
 
Society Works Best subscales 
Group 
1 - Society works best when... 
people realize the world is dangerous 
OR people assume that all those in far away places are kindly 
 
4 - Society works best when... 
we take care of our own people first 
OR we realize people everywhere deserve our help 
 
7 - Society works best when... 
people take primary responsibility for their own welfare 
OR people join together to help others 
 
9 - Society works best when... 
people recognize the unavoidable flaws of human nature 
OR people recognize that humans can be changed in positive ways 
 
10 - Society works best when... 
every member contributes the same amount 
OR more fortunate members contribute more in order to help others 
 
12 - Society works best when... 
those who break the rules are punished 
OR those who break the rules are forgiven 
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Values 
3 - Society works best when... 
established ideas are favored 
OR new ideas are favored 
 
5 - Society works best when... 
leaders compromise with their opponents in order to get things done 
OR leaders adhere to their principles no matter what 
 
6 - Society works best when... 
people live according to traditional values 
OR people adjust their values to fit changing circumstances 
 
11 - Society works best when... 
behavioral expectations are based on an eternal code 
OR behavioral expectations are allowed to evolve over the decades 
 
Leader 
2 - Society works best when... 
leaders are obeyed 
OR leaders are questioned 
 
8 - Society works best when... 
it speaks with one voice 
OR it speaks with many voices 
 
Wilson Patterson subscales 
Social ideology 
1 - School prayer 
4 - Pornography 
6 - Women's equality 
7 - Death penalty 
8 - Premarital sex 
9 - Gay marriage 
10 - Abortion rights 
11 - Evolution 
13 - Biblical truth 
16 - Protect gun rights 
25 - Stem cell research 
26 - Abstinence-only sex education 
 
Economic ideology 
15 - Increase welfare spending 
21 - Small government 
24 - Lower taxes 
